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STEVEN W. LAWRY*

Tenure Policy Toward Common
Property Natural Resources in
Sub-Saharan Africa
ABSTRACT
This article considersproblems in improving the management of
common property natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa. Poor
management is often attributedto obtrusive state policies which have
undercut local institutions. Some recent policy studies conclude that
authority over resources should be devolved to local authorities or
user groups. This paper argues that, while state management is
ineffective, incentives for individuals to participate in local management activities are weak, and local institutionsare usually unable
to generate sufficient sanction locally to enforce rules. Short-term
policies are suggested for strengthening the respective weaknesses
of states and communities through "co-management" arrangements.
INTRODUCTION

Policy-makers concerned with relationships between development and
natural resource management have sought ways to promote better local
management of resources used in common, such as grazing land, forests,
and wildlife and biological resources. At the same time academic interest
in local-level common property management institutions has increased.'
Effective policies for management of common resources are particularly
urgent for sub-Saharan Africa, where most rangeland and forests are used
communally. Population growth and technological change have contrib*Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author wishes to thank John Bruce,
Carol Dickerman, Peter Dorner, Don Kanel, Kenneth Parsons, Brent Swallow, and William Thiesenhusen for their helpful comments on various drafts of this paper. Christine Drennon and Dawn
Lafleur provided valuable research assistance. This paper was prepared under the auspices of the
Land Tenure Center's program on tenure issues in natural resource management in sub-Saharan
Africa, which is supported by a grant from the Africa Bureau, U.S. Agency for International
Development (AID). Africa Bureau funding is provided through the Land Tenure Center's Cooperative Agreement with AID's Bureau of Science and Technology. An earlier version of the paper
was presented at the conference on "Incentives and Constraints: Macroeconomic Policy Impacts on
Natural Resource Utilization," sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution and Africa Bureau, AID,
and held at the Smithsonian International Center, Washington, D.C., May 11-12, 1989.
I. National Research Council, Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Management
(1986); The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources (B.
McCay & J. Acheson eds. 1987); Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-based
Sustainable Development (F. Berkes ed. 1989).
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uted to overgrazing and deforestation, while post-independence political
changes and administrative reforms have apparently undercut the legal
bases for effective local regulation. Recent policy studies have advocated

the merits of decentralized, local management of communal resources. 2
Donor agencies and national governments have used pilot projects to test
various models of local-level management.
This article questions the effectiveness of policies which would rely
upon local-level common property arrangements as the principal means

of improving common resource management in sub-Saharan Africa. Such
policies are built on theoretical foundations which do not consider significant constraints on the emergence of local collective action. The article
evaluates theoretical perspectives in relation to case study materials from

Africa and elsewhere, and offers a new framework for policy analysis.
Recent interest in local common property management has evolved

from debates within the academic community and among donor agencies
over how systems of property rights affect resource management. The
current debate was initiated in 1968 by Garrett Hardin's critique of individual decisionmaking where resources are used in common, which he

characterized as "the tragedy of the commons. "4 Using communal grazing
as his model, Hardin argued that the additional benefits to the individual
herder of adding one more animal to an optimally stocked common pasture will exceed his costs, measured in terms of reduced range productivity
resulting from the animal's contribution to overgrazing. 5 This occurs
because the marginal costs of overgrazing are shared among the community of users, while the herder enjoys the total benefit of the added
2. See generally, Associates in Rural Development, Inc., Options for Promoting User-based
Governance of Sahelian Renewable Natural Resources (Paper prepared for presentation at the CILSSsponsored conference, "Regional Encounter on a Better Socioecological Balance in the Rural Sahel,"
May, 1989); J. McNeely, Economics and Biological Diversity: Developing and Using Economic
Incentives to Conserve Biological Resources (1988); A. Shaikh, E. Amould, K. Christophersen, R.
Hagen, J. Tabor & P. Warshall, Opportunities for Sustained Development: Successful Natural Resource Management in the Sahel (1988).
3. Examples include the USAID-assisted Forestry and Land Use Project (FLUP) in Niger, which
developed a forest management plan and established a fuelwood marketing cooperative in a degraded
forest reserve near Niamey; the Land Conservation and Range Development Project (LCRD) in
Lesotho, also assisted by USAID, which established grazing associations in mountain areas; and
the Eastern Senegal Livestock Development Project, assisted by the World Bank, which promoted
establishment of pastoral associations.
4. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).
5. Hardin implicitly assumes zero marginal herding costs. id. However, as more pasture resources
are used, "increasing amounts of labor and capital have to be applied at the margin to obtain equal
increments of production." Stryker, Land Use Development in the Pastoral Zone of West Africa, in
Livestock Development in Subsaharan Africa 175 (J. Simpson & P. Evangelow eds. 1984). Diminishing returns can exist in the absence of overgrazing, and can lead herders to limit stock numbers
before the technical limits to production are reached. See Gordon, The EconomicTheory bfa CommonProperty Resource, 62 J.Pol. Econ. 124 (1954) (discussing the economic theory of "the tragedy
of the commons").
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unit of production. Under such circumstances, rational herders will build
up their private herds even after the carrying capacity of the commons
is exceeded. Eventually, ecological collapse results. For Hardin, the solution was in tenure reform, to something resembling private property.6
Some programs of range tenure reform, such as the Tribal Grazing
Lands Policy (TGLP) in Botswana, drew their rationale directly from
Hardin's "tragedy of the commons." The TGLP, a World Bank-assisted
program, granted individuals long-term, exclusive lease rights to lands
previously used for communal grazing.7 The government paper introducing the policy to the Botswana Parliament stated:
Under our communal grazing system it is in no one individual's
interest to limit the number of his animals. If one man takes his
cattle off, someone else moves his own cattle in. Unless livestock
numbers are somehow tied to specific grazing areas no one has an
incentive to control grazing.'
Over the last 15 years, a literature critical of the "tragedy of the
commons" analysis has developed. Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop faulted
Hardin and other proponents of this view for failing to distinguish between
common use situations characterized by an absence of defined property
rights governing access and use, typically referred to as open access, and
common property, defined as "a distribution of property rights in resources in which a number of owners are co-equal in their rights to use
the resource." 9 In terms of the distinction employed by Ciriacy-Wantrup
and Bishop, Hardin's hypothetical pasture would not be a valid example
of common property, but of open access. Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop
faulted those who described communal use only in terms of the "tragedy
of the commons" for overlooking the existence of common property
arrangements, and their potential for accommodating sustainable resource
use." Under common property, the use rights of individuals could be
defined and limited to prevent overuse of the common resource. In many
settings, communal use has economic and ecological advantages over
individual use. The costs of delineating clear private property rights to
many kinds of resources would be prohibitively high. Certain resource
6. Hardin, supra note 4, at 1245.
7. For discussion of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy, see Picard, Bureaucrats, Cattle and Public
Policy: Land Tenure Changes in Botswana, 13 Comp. Pol. Stud. 313 (1980); S. Lawry, Land Tenure,
Land Policy, and Smallholder Livestock Development in Botswana (Land Tenure Center Research
Paper No. 78, 1983).
8. Government of Botswana, National Policy on Tribal Grazing Land (Government White Paper
No. 2, 1975).
9. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, "Common Property" As a Concept in Natural Resources Policy,
15 Nat. Res. J. 713, 714 (1975).
10. Id. at 715.
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needs of poor people and small-scale users are more likely to be met
within common property regimes. In arid or semi-arid rangelands, where
range productivity varies seasonally and spatially with variable rainfall,
communal use accommodates relatively easy herd movement in pursuit
of available grazing.
The concept of common property provides a useful corrective to Hardin's oversimplified critique of collective resource use. However, establishing local-level common property arrangements may be difficult. Credible
common property rules will emerge from social and economic relationships which can sustain rule-making and rule-enforcing institutions. The
changing nature of village economies and social relations, coupled with
growing pressures on local resources, may limit the scope for local action.
Common property arrangements extant under former social and economic
conditions may not have the ability to successfully manage resources
under contemporary circumstances. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between a minimum definition of common property, and common
property arrangements required to regulate resource use intensively.
A minimum definition of common property is met where rules define
who has access to the commons. For instance, in many traditional
African societies, only members of a village community would have use
rights to surrounding pasturage or forest products; others would be excluded. " Membership qualifications alone may facilitate sustainable use,
as long as demand remains in rough correspondence with supply and is
relatively constant over time. In many low-technology, traditional economies, various technical constraints often interacted with low rates of
population growth to maintain a de facto balance between demand and
supply. 2
Explicit controls over the behavior of qualified commons users will
become necessary where, due to technological change or population growth,
local resource demand exceeds sustainable supply.' 3 If the community of
i. Berry, Concentration without Privatization? Some Consequences of Changing Patterns of
Rural Land Control in Africa in Land and Society in Contemporary Africa 53 (R. Downs & S.
Reyna eds. 1988); V. Uchendu, The Conflict between National Land Policies and Policies and Local
Sovereignty over Land in Tropical Africa (Paper presented at seminar on Problems of Land Tenure
and African Development, Leiden, Netherlands, December 1971).
12. Bromley states that common property is present where two conditions are met. The first
condition corresponds with the minimum definition of common property used here: "The management
group ("the owners") has [the] right to exclude nonmembers, and nonmembers have [the] duty to
abide by exclusion." The second condition is that "Individual members of the management group
(the "co-owners") have both rights and duties with respect to use rates and maintenance of the thing
owned." Bromley, Property Relations and Economic Development: The Other Land Reform. 17
World Dev. 867, 872 (1989). The former condition is frequently present in common property use
situations in Africa; the latter condition is rarely present.
13. Ciriacy-Wantrp & Bishop attribute breakdown in common property controls in historically
isolated hunting and gathering economies to contact with the market economy. Hunters and gatherers
begin "overusing their resources in order to acquire market products." Ciriacy-Wantrp & Bishop,
supra note 9,at 718.
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users cannot regulate their members under conditions of scarcity and
competition, then conditions similar to "open access" prevail. Rules must
be reformulated to account for changing circumstances. This will usually
involve intensifying controls and limiting use rights of qualified users.
Establishing and enforcing more intensive controls may entail higher costs
and put unbearable political strains on management groups or local authorities. The balance of costs and benefits-political and economicmay shift in favor of other tenure systems, such as one based on private
property, or upon controls administered by state authorities.
Some recent critiques of the breakdown of local common property
management systems have placed primary blame upon obtrusive state
action, where states have undercut supposedly viable local systems by
asserting rights over natural resources.' Obtrusive state action has been
a factor, but the decline of local control and the rise of national authority
over natural resources are more properly seen as features of national
economic and political integration and other changes associated with
economic development.
This article argues that the modernization process itself has reduced
incentives for individuals to participate in localized collective arrangements, has undercut the economic viability of common property institutions, and has reduced the political legitimacy of local management
authorities. Population growth and technological change have increased
pressures on natural resources to the extent that minimum common property rules do not provide effective regulation. Local institutions, weakened
by far-reaching economic changes, are unlikely to engender support at
the local level for imposition of intensive controls, especially where there
is little precedent for direct regulation.
Local common property management will not emerge simply by giving
greater official rein to local action. Policy initiatives will have little impact
unless an important array of incentives supportive of common property
management are operating at the local level. This paper is less sanguine
than some about the effectiveness of autonomous local action in this area.
INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS TO LOCAL-LEVEL
MANAGEMENT: SOME CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
A theoretical argument for why local-level common property management should emerge has been provided by Runge, who believes that
strong incentives operate in favor of collective action in Third World
village situations. 5 Interdependent decisionmaking about resource use is
14. D. Bromley & M. Cemea, The Management of Common Property Natural Resources: Some
Conceptual and Operational Fallacies (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 57, 1989); J. McNelly,
supra note 2.
15. Runge, Common Propertyand Collective Action in Economic Development, Proceedings of
the Conference on Common Property Resource Management 31 (1985) (Panel on Common Property
Resource Management eds.).
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characteristic of the "village economy." Runge cites three interrelated
features of the village economy which should spawn collective action.
First, relative poverty imposes a budget constraint on many forms of
individual action, to the extent that many activities are only possible
through joint action. Joint use fisheries, grazing areas, and forests may
arise because the high transactions costs of "well-defined and enforced
property typical of the West may be too great for a subsistence economy
to bear."' 6
Second, where the productivity of the resource base is low and varies
spatially and over time, as in the case of rangelands, individuals will
require access to various portions of the commons season to season and
year to year.'7 The third characteristic of the village economy is a function
of the first two. In the face of relative poverty and environmental uncertainty, common property institutions may be created that "rather than
emphasizing the right to exclude some . . . provide instead for the right
of many to be equally included as a hedge against uncertainty."" 8 Furthermore, "interdependence places a premium on mechanisms that coordinate community decisions."'9 Free-riding is implausible where common
property institutions provide individual commons users assurance about
the behavior of others by making and enforcing common property rules.'
The incentives for the emergence of common property arrangements
are not as compelling as Runge's model of the village economy would
suggest, mainly because the model fails to capture the true character of
village economies in increasingly open economic systems. When analyzing village economies, the whole range of strategies available to villagers in pursuing a living must be considered. In many situations, reliance
upon communal resources is declining. Natural resources used by villagers
are both private and communal in character. In most non-pastoral areas,
principal sources of agricultural income are usually secured from crop
production on individual holdings, and not from the commons.' Villagers
seek and find substitutes for some communal resources-such as fuel16. Id. at 33.
17. Id. at 35.
18, id.

19. Id. at 43.
20. Id.
21. The literature on African customary land tenure systems has long acknowledged the individual
nature of farmer rights to cropland. "Even where communal ownership was imposed [by state action]
cultivation and possession remained with individual households, and an increasing range of rights
to land were appropriated by individual households." Feder & Noronha, Land Rights Systems and
Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 World Bank Res. Observer, July 1987, at 143,

163. In mixed crop-livestock systems, households typically cultivate individual holdings while relying
on access to communal grazing areas for livestock production. See also Bohannon, 'Land,' 'Tenure'
and 'Land Tenure,' in African Agrarian Systems (D. Biebuyck ed. 1973).
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wood-as local supply diminishes, or take steps to develop private sources
of supply.22 Increasingly, villagers pursue income in other, mainly nonagricultural sectors of the economy, and are reliant on remittance income
sent home by members working in cities.23 Villages are part of larger
economies, which offer villagers a greater range of strategic choice than
is the case in the isolated village economy posited by Runge.
The open character of today's village economy, and the fact that essential village resources are both private and collective in character, mean
that individuals have alternative income sources to often declining common property resources. These factors reduce the stimulus for collective
action which might result where income alternatives to communal resources are absent. Such circumstances can lead to greater competition,
not cooperation, in the use of communal resources.
These features of the village economy give rise to several policy issues,
which may be summarized as the problem of incentives and the problem
of authority. The problem of incentives means that economic incentives
are often insufficient to stimulate individuals to participate in or sanction
local-level resource management. The economic returns to collective action will, for many individual users, be marginal or even negative. The
resource in question may be of minor importance in relation to other
sources of income, substitutes may exist, and the resource's relative
importance may vary from user to user. In the case of some resources,
such as low productivity grazing land, optimum use may in fact be
achieved where users exercise maximum individual discretion over management decisions.
The second issue is the problem of authority. This relates to the difficulties local communities have in moving beyond the minimum definition of common property, to establishing and enforcing rules and
procedures governing resource use. This problem is grounded in part in
the incentive problem noted above. Where resource rights are granted as
a matter of social right, or where projects promote user groups as management authorities, groups will have to achieve internal consensus on
22. Mung'ala & Openshaw, Estimation of Present and Future Demand for Woodfuel in Machakos

District, in Wood, Energy and Households: Perspectives on Rural Kenya 102 (C. Barnes, J. Ensminger and P. O'Keefe eds. 1984); R. Moss & W. Morgan, Fuelwood and Rural Energy Production

and Supply in the Humid Tropics (1981).
23. Anderson and Leiserson state that:
Nonfarm activities in rural areas are a primary source of employment and earnings for
approximately one-quarter of the rural labor force in most developing countries....
and a significant source of secondary earnings in the slack seasons for the small and
landless farmers .... Historical evidence reveals a rising share of the rural labor force
engaged in nonfarm work.
Anderson & Leiserson, Rural Nonfarm Employment in Developing Countries, 29 Econ. Dev. &

Cultural Change 227, 229-330 (1980).
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management policy. Democratically constituted user groups must rely on
the sanction of their membership to enforce rules. Where interests are
heterogeneous and views toward appropriate resource use standards vary,
sufficiently strong support for enforcement of many kinds of rules will
not emerge. Reliance upon existing structures of elite authority, such as
chiefs, may be appropriate in some situations. However, local authority
generally is losing ground to state authority. Traditional authorities especially have lost or are losing their legitimacy, and patron-client relationships are weakening.
These problems of incentives and authority are complex. Their significance varies according to the nature of the resource, the role of the
resource in the local and national economy, and past and present policies
toward resource management. It is worth considering them in greater
detail.
THE INCENTIVES PROBLEM
Over the last several years, a case study literature has developed which
examines problems communities of users have in managing common
property resources. Some policy lessons from that literature are considered
below.
Collective Action is More Likely to Result Where the Common
Resource is Critical to Local Incomes and is Scarce
Rarely are both of these conditions present. If common property institutions are more likely to emerge where the resource is of critical
economic importance to local users, then the prospects for bringing resources of relatively low economic value under improved local common
property management cannot be very good. Where wildlife, complex
forest habitats, and other biological resources have little economic value
to local people, sustainable local management institutions are unlikely to
emerge, especially where these resources compete for land for agricultural
purposes.' Steps might be taken to improve the incentives for conservation by increasing the value of the resource to local people such as by
granting hunting rights where none exist, or by granting communities a
percentage of forest concession revenues.25
Many common property resources, such as fuelwood and grazing, are
24. Anderson & Grove, The Scramblefor Eden: Past, Present and FutureinAfrican Conservation,
in Conservation in Africa: People, Policies and Practice I (D. Anderson & R. Grove eds. 1987).
25. The Luangwa valley project in Zambia and the CAMPFIRE program (Communal Area Management Plan for Indigenous Resources) in Zimbabwe are two examples of attempts by wildlife
authorities to give villagers and local governments a share of revenues generated through wildlife
hunting concessions and tourism. For a discussion of this approach to resource management, see
Bell, Conservation With a Human Face: Conflict and Reconciliation in African Land Use Planning,
in Conservation in Africa: People, Policies and Practice 79 (D. Anderson & R. Grove eds. 1987).
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subject to increasing scarcity. Although fuelwood is an important source
of energy in much of Africa, it may be a relatively minor component of

overall household income, particularly in relation to agriculture. Reduction in supply of fuelwood is partially attributable to conversion of forests
to agricultural land uses, accompanied by shifts from communal to individual forms of land tenure. 26 Eicher estimates that the cheapest source
of increased food production in most land-abundant countries in sub-

Saharan Africa is expansion of land under cultivation, and not intensification of production on existing agricultural land.27 In many parts of
Africa, cropping systems involving long-term forest fallow are giving
way to more continuous cultivation. Where land use changes are resulting
in reduction of communal forests, it may be appropriate to promote

technical packages for intensive production of fuel and forage tree species
on individual holdings." 8

Long-distance trade in fuelwood, common in the Sahel, may assure a
continuing supply, albeit at higher cost. However, costs may not be

sufficiently high to offset the transactions costs associated with intensifying management of natural forests, or with participating in village
woodlot projects.29 Energy substitutes are often available, though use of
26. Timberlake observes that:
Large areas of savanna woodland and dry tropical forest are being cleared each year
to make way for cash crops. Guinea Bissau loses 20,000-35,000 hectares of forest
each year to peanuts and other commercial crops; Burkina Faso loses 85,000 hectares
a year. Pressure of land shortage in the peanut basin of Senegal is causing about 50,000
hectares per year of savanna woodland to be cleared to provide farmland.
L. Timberlake, Africa in Crisis 109 (1986).
27. C. Eicher, African Agriculture: Research Challenges for Social and Technical Scientists in
the 1990s (paper presented at the Summer Institute for African Agricultural Research, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, July 1989); Paulino estimates that between 1960 and 1980, 80 percent of the
increase in African food production came from area expansion, with the remainder coming from an
increase in yields. During the same period, 100 percent of growth in food production in West Africa
came from area expansion. Paulino, The Evolving Food Situation, in Accelerating Food Production
in Sub-Saharan Africa 30 (J. Mellor, C. Delgado, and M. Blackie eds. 1987).
28. Fast growing tree crops for use as fuelwood, livestock forage and green manure are being
researched and tested by the three principal international agricultural research centers active in subSaharan Africa: the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in lbadan, Nigeria, the
International Livestock Center for Africa (ILCA) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the International
Council for Research on Agroforestry (ICRAF) in Nairobi, Kenya. ILCA's research program on
animal feed resources gives "special emphasis [to] the integration of legumes in mixed crop-livestock
farming systems so as to achieve stable and sustainable feed and food production," International
Livestock Centre for Africa, Sustainable Production from Livestock in sub-Saharan Africa, ILCA's
Programme Plans and Funding Requirements, 1989-1993 28 (1988).
29. Levels of villager participation in woodlot projects in Africa have been low. This is often
attributed to unclear or low expectations of individual returns to labor contributions, in the form of
a portion of the harvested wood or profit from wood sales. For instance, Turner concludes that
"(agro)forestry production is more attractive to rural people when it offers direct individual profit,
without a Forestry Division or a village committee as intermediaries." Turner, Land and Trees in
Lesotho, in Whose Trees: Proprietary Dimensions of Forestry 202 (L. Fortmann & J. Bruce eds.
1988).
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some, such as crop residues and cow dung, can have undesirable ecological effects.20 Poor segments of the community may be most dependent
upon local fuelwood for energy, but may lack a power base within the
community to assert control over its use. Local elites often lay claim to
the benefits of rural forestry projects intended to help the poor once outside
technical assistance leaves the area.3
Resource scarcity can lead to cooperative management or greater competition and individual action to privatize the resource. Wade, in a study
of village management of irrigation schemes in south India, found that
"corporate organization to manage common property is found, with hardly
any exceptions, only towards the tail-ends of distributories (where resources are most scarce)." 32 Upstream villages were wasteful in their use
of water, and rationing institutions appeared nonexistent. From this Wade
concluded that "the opportunities for avoiding losses or making income
gains by collective action will only be taken if the losses or gains are
large.",3 3 Based upon his research findings, Wade deduced several lessons
for designing common property organizations. Most important among
them is that "villagers are likely to follow joint rules and arrangements
only to achieve intensely felt needs that could not be met by individual
responses. "'
Scarcity will not necessarily result in common property solutions, but
may lead individual users to attempt to enclose the commons for private
use. Spontaneous enclosure movements are taking place on rangelands
in East Africa, including Kenya, Somalia, and the Sudan. 35 Behnke at30. Casey and Muir observe that:
Overall, . . . deteriorating fuclwood supplies have provided little incentive to those
involved to do something about them [despite the fact] that as fuelwood gets scarcer
people who gather it carry loads of firewood over longer and longer distances and
with the growing scarcity, crop residues (which could be turned back into the soil) are
diverted for fuel use.
J. Casey & K. Muir, Forestry for Rural Development in Zimbabwe 3 (ODI Social Forestry Network
Paper 3c, 1986).
31. Shepherd, Social Forestry in 1985: Lessons Learnt and Topics to be Addressed, ODI Social
Forestry Network Paper la (1985).
32. Wade, Common Property Resource Management in South Indian Villages, in Proceedings of
the Conference on Common Property Resource Management 231 (1986).
33. Id. at 248-49.
34. Id. at 248. Similarly, Pinkerton, Cooperative Management of Local Fisheries: A Route to
Development, in Production and Autonomy 257 (J. Bennett & J. Bowen eds. 1988), shows that
fishery cooperatives in North America are established out of painstaking adaptations to the realities
of declining fish stocks. Cooperation is usually a last resort, and is achieved only when the high
financial costs of individualistic, strictly competitive strategies prove to be unsustainable.
35. R. Behnke, The Implications of Spontaneous Range Enclosure for African Livestock Development Policy (African Livestock Policy Network Paper No. 12, 1986) [hereinafter Behnke 1986];
Behnke, Range Enclosure in Central Somalia (Pastoral Development Network Paper 25b, 1988); 0.
Graham, Enclosure of the East African Rangelands: Recent Trends and Their Impact (Pastoral
Development Network Paper 25a, 1988).
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tributes range enclosure to three related factors: (1) a decline in the supply
and a corresponding increase in the scarcity value of grazing land leads
to, (2) increases in the commercial value of range or livestock production,
and (3) decreases in the relative costs of enclosure--costs which are social
and political in nature as well as monetary.36
Collective responses were essential to operation of the irrigation systems studied by Wade, but not essential to use of the extensive rangelands
studied by Behnke. Depending upon the nature of the resource and local
social and economic relationships, local action could result in privatization
and not a common property solution. Those making a larger claim on the
resource, by virtue of large herd size or ability to mobilize labor or other
assets, can more easily position themselves to assert exclusive rights than
can small claimants. Options for claiming and registering land titles available in national legislation can be used by the better-educated and influential to assert private claims to previously communal land. Policy-makers
may therefore be concerned with impeding attempts by the powerful to
capture the commons for private use.
Collective Action Will Be More Difficult to Achieve Where Interest
in the Resource as a Source of Income Varies, or Where Resource
Use Strategies Differ Significantly
Widespread recognition of resource degradation will not necessarily
result in effective collective action where interest in the resource as a
source of income varies. In a pilot range management project in Lesotho,
the Government of Lesotho and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) established a grazing association at Sehlabathebe
in the Drakensburg Mountains, and gave it management control over a
badly degraded watershed.37 A popularly elected executive committee
was responsible for administering a grazing management plan which
provided for the seasonal rotation of livestock among winter grazing areas
near villages and summer grazing areas in the surrounding mountains.
36. Behnke 1986, supra note 35. Graham attributes spontaneous enclosure of Masai group ranches
into individual parcels to a number of factors.
Drought, resulting in a general scarcity of good grazing, can lead to a desire to lay

claim to what grazing still exists and exclude others from it. Overstocking . . . has
led to a decline in the quality and quantity of available grazing. Public borehole
development and private investment in water development have made some areas of
rangeland suddenly very attractive. Individuals have invested in constructing permanent
houses. An increase in the commercial value of livestock has made intensification of
production desirable. All of these factors have contributed to an increase in spontaneous
enclosure.
0. Graham, supra note 35, at 6.
37. S. Lawry, Private Herds and Common Land: Issues in the Management of Communal Grazing
Land in Lesotho, Southern Africa (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1988).
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Livestock found grazing in violation of the plan were subject to impoundment by range riders, local enforcement agents paid by the association.
Range conditions improved, but levels of rule violation were high.
Subsequent research identified two principal reasons for low acceptance
of the plan.3" The original plan did not take sufficient account of traditional
grazing patterns, or of constraints faced by individuals in adopting new
patterns. Large numbers of livestock already rotated seasonally between
winter pastures in the villages and summer pastures in the mountains,
but the grazing plan sought to impose universal adoption of a more
complex grazing rotation. Individual grazing strategies were dictated by
a variety of factors, such as availability of herding labor, and herd size
and species composition. These factors were themselves related to such
household characteristics as age, sex and residential status of the household head, and the relative importance of livestock and remittances as
income sources. Only about 16 percent of households cited livestock
production as their principal source of cash income, though 84 percent
of households owned livestock. About half of the working-age males
were absent, most working in the mining sector in South Africa. Fifty
percent of household cash income was in the form of remittances from
mine workers. The most popular aspect of the plan (and the most vigorously enforced) was its prohibition against outsiders grazing local pastures. But many villagers had a laissez-faire attitude toward grazing
management locally, which seemed appropriate in light of the great variety
of individual needs and circumstances influencing herd management strategies. Through a process of negotiation between the project and the
grazing association, the plan was simplified to better reflect local realities.
A second and more intractable factor hindering plan adoption (including
adoption of the amended plan) was that many villagers did not recognize
the authority of the executive committee to regulate range use. Traditionally, village chiefs had been responsible for grazing regulation, but
attentiveness to their regulatory functions had waned. The executive committee was dominated by large holders, principally mohair and wool
producers, who despaired over poor grazing conditions and who saw in
the association an opportunity to take matters into their own hands. As
a democratically-constituted user group, the basis of the association's
long-term authority was in organizing cooperation based on reciprocitythat is, conformance to rules based on the expectation that others will
also conform.39 But many large holders (including some members of the
38. Id. 218-76.
39. Sugden, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions,94 Econ.
J. 772 (1984).
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executive committee) proved willing to violate features of the grazing
plan when it suited them. Many villagers (including some large holders
willing to observe the grazing plan) gained the impression that the association existed principally to serve the interests of executive committee
members. Enforcement of the plan fell to the Lesotho and expatriate
project staff, who as outsiders were perceived to be socially neutral and
technically competent.'
Reliance of villagers upon external sources of income, in this case
remittances from absent men working in South African mines, probably
contributed to a lack of interest by many in intensifying resource management. Increasing dependence upon external sources of income is not
a phenomenon peculiar to Southern Africa. Similar patterns of large-scale
labor migration and reliance upon non-agricultural income are seen in
the Sahel and in other regions of Africa. 4'
THE AUTHORITY PROBLEM

Economic Integration Reduces the Scope for Local Action
The Lesotho case illustrates some of the difficulties of coordinating
group action where economic incentives for adopting a standard grazing
plan vary among the community of users. Successful collective responses
to communal use problems often begin with efforts by local small-scale
users to defend their rights in the face of attempts by outside (and often
large, commercial) interests to privatize the commons, or to overexploit
it.4' Local attempts to defend the commons against encroachment are
ordinarily based upon some assertion of social territoriality, or defining
who is "us" in relation to "them" in terms of the minimum definition
of common property set out earlier in this paper.43 But integration into
larger systems means the social and economic center of gravity shifts
away from the community, and rural institutions become politically marginalized." The impacts of new technologies and large-scale markets for
resources cut across territorially-based user groups and even local gov40. Differential interests in livestock as a source of income probably ruled out the emergence of
the kind of broadly based consensus necessary to make an intensive grazing management plan work.
Livestock producers more dependent upon remittances (which were the principal cash income source
for 50 percent of households) were less likely to be paid-up members of the grazing association than
were commercially-oriented large holders. S. Lawry, supra note 37, at 252.
41. For instance, Eicher reports that in sub-Saharan Africa between "25 to 50 percent of the
working time of smallholder farm families is spent in off-farm jobs during slack periods of the
farming season." C. Eicher, supra note 27, at 6.
42. McCay & Acheson, Human Ecology of the Commons, in The Question of the Commons,
supra note 1, at 1.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 10 to 12.

44. Fernandez, The Call to the Commons: Decline and Recommitment in Asturias, Spain, in The
Question of the Commons, supra note I, at 266.
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ernment units. Regulatory functions become more complex and must
cover larger areas than the local political unit.45 Centralization of political
authority reduces the ability of the community to defend its claims to the

commons in the face of encroachment by outsiders and penetration of
tenure arrangements prevailing in the rest of the system. The conditions
necessary for attainment of even minimum common property controls-'
limiting rights of access based on broadly shared cultural or social tiesare often no longer present.'
Minimum common property arrangements do not necessarily provide
a viable base upon which to build more intensive management controls.
The original design of group ranches in Kenya provided that a committee
of traditional elders would manage the ranches. Project designers assumed
that high levels of social integration and deeply shared cultural values
provided sufficient bases for intensive group control of livestock and
rangeland. While Masai have traditionally worked out arrangements for
sharing grazing and herding tasks, traditional management practices in
fact entail high levels of individual autonomy in range use and livestock
management, and especially in financial matters involving purchase of
inputs and livestock marketing. Some large herd owners have adopted
commercial production strategies, involving higher levels of private investment in water supplies and fencing. Commercial producers were
reluctant to share limited grazing. 7 Management committees rarely functioned, and the current trend is for group ranches to be broken up and
registered under individual title.4

45. Dorner, Technology, Institutions,Global Economy and World Peace, 74 Wis. Acad. of Sci.,
Arts and Letters 14 (1986).
46. Fernandez argues that integration of local economies into larger systems contributes to "defection" from the commons, or declining support at the local level for common use arrangements.
Increasing reliance of local people on extensive networks of market relations reduces the importance
of local production and exchange relations which may have acted to mediate access to the commons
and underpinned its economic importance locally. Fernandez, The Call to the Commons: Decline
and Recommitment in Asturias, Spain, in The Question of the Commons, supra note 44, at 285.
47. 0. Graham, supra note 35, at 4.
48. Case studies of Masai group ranches are provided by 0. Graham, supra note 35, and Grandin,
Kajiado Masailand: the Socio-historicalContext and Group Ranches, in Masai Herding: An Investigation of Pastoral Production on Group Ranches in Kenya (S. Bekure, P. de Leeuw & B. Grandin
eds. 1989); A. Jacobs, An Overview of Population Dynamics in Kenya's Rangelands (1969-1979)
(1984) (report submitted to the [Kenya] Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development). Where
local management by user groups is effective, it often depends on an embedded egalitarianism and
sense of moral obligation to one's neighbor which is not easily created through policy initiatives,
but which grows out of convention and rough-and-ready experience. Taylor provides a case study
of an Irish fishing community which steadfastly resisted outsider attempts to organize a local cooperative, in part out of fear that informal and fairly successful mechanisms for managing the fishery
would fall victim to conflicts inherent to organizations with formalized decision processes. Taylor,
"The River Would Run Red With Blood": Community and Common Property in an Irish Fishing
Settlement, in The Question of the Commons, supra note 1,at 290.
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The Authority of Traditional Authorities and Local Elites is
Eroding
Where incentives are insufficient, or democratically constituted user
groups have difficulty asserting control over "free riders," it may be
appropriate to rely on traditional authorities or local elites, particularly
for rule enforcement. Wade observes that common property management
organizations should "draw on existing structures of authority."'49 Irrigation councils in the south India villages studied by Wade were effective
where councils were made up of large holders-people with substantial
private interests in seeing that the irrigation scheme worked and who,
thereby, found it in their "interest to bear the transaction costs of orga50
nizing others to share in the cost of providing the collective good."
They were able to enforce rules through manipulation of the patron-client
relationships that existed between elites and the mass of poor water-users.
But an accompanying feature of national economic integration is that the
bonds between patrons and clients are dissolving as the poor pursue a
wider range of income options, and as the elite shed their social obligations
to former clients.5
Traditional Authority over Resources Rarely Extends to Intensive
Control over Individual Use
Analysts sometimes assume that traditional authorities such as chiefs
have more power, or exercise more authority in certain realms, than is
in fact the case. Centralized control over livestock and range management
has generally not been a feature of pastoral societies in sub-Saharan
Africa. An anthropologist makes the following observations on livestock
and range management projects in Sahelian West Africa:
Many development documents exhibit a "take me to your leader"
optic; they advise getting the approval of traditional chiefs for any
proposed changes, under the assumption that the rest of the community will follow along. Few pastoral societies are in fact so hierarchically organized. On the contrary, the more likely situation is
that there is no individual who has the authority to tell any other
member of his community how the latter should handle his animals.
Many pastoral societies have no centralization of managerial deci49. Wade, supra note 32, at 249.
50. Id..
51. Commercial elites enter into a smaller range of dependent relationships than traditional elites.
For an African case study, see Jones, Social Networks of Farmers Among the Plateau Tonga of
Zambia, in The New Elites of Tropical Africa 272 (R. Lloyd ed. 1966). A classic study of patronclient relationships in Asia is Scott & Kerkvliet, How Traditional Rural Patrons Lose Legitimacy,
5 Cultures et Developpement 501 (1973).
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sions relating to access to grazing lands and water, and therefore
herd size, composition, and movements. 2
The nature of rangeland resources complicates the whole question of
corporate management for livestock and range production. Some analysts
dispute the conventional wisdom in range management, that stocking
levels should be maintained at a carrying capacity usually defined by the
lowest average rainfall level (and hence the lowest average range productivity). Range productivity varies greatly with highly variable rainfall,
in space and in time. An optimum strategy is one which accommodates
adjustment of herd size to available forage, and/or accommodates movement of herds over extensive areas in pursuit of forage where it is available. Sandford defines such a strategy as "opportunistic," as distinct from
a "conservative" strategy of maintaining stock numbers at levels which
could be supported by low average forage production." Riesman, in a
study of Fulani range management, suggests that independent, "opportunistic" decisionmaking is essential to successful livestock production
in the Sahel:
It is important to understand that both Fulani political organization
and their love of independence contribute significantly to the Fulani
ability to take advantage of the economic resources of the Sahel.
. . We have seen that land is best utilized when people and cattle
spread out to the maximum degree, and for this to happen people
have to be relatively independent of one another, able to make their
own decisions and take their own risks, and like being in that situation.'
*

Post-independence political reforms have reduced the authority of local
chiefs all over Africa; in many cases, they now act as minor government
functionaries. Economic and social changes have also undercut their authority. Isaac Schapera made the following observations on the implications of labor migration to the political authority of Tswana chiefs in
an article published in 1928. This passage provides a graphic example
of how the center of gravity shifts away from the local unit toward the
center.
Instead of working for their Chief [villagers] now worked for themselves: the accumulation of wealth became a motive in the life of
52. M. Horowitz, The Sociology of Pastoralism and African Livestock Projects (AID Program
Evauation Discussion Paper No. 6, 67, 1979).
53. Sandford, Pastoral Strategies and African Livestock Projects, in Desertification and Development: Dryland Ecology in Social Perspective 61 (B. Spooner & H. Mann eds. 1982).
54. P. Riesman, The Fulani in a Development Context: The Relevance of Cultural Traditions for
Coping with Change and Crisis 28 (1978) (report written under USAID contract no. REDSO/WA78-138, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.).
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every individual. Travel and the absence for longer or shorter periods
from their home environment widened the breach between the chief
and his subjects. The economic reciprocity which entered so strongly
into the relations between chief and subjects, and which formed one
of the vital features of the economic system, has broken down almost
completely. The chief no longer plays the part of tribal banker: his
function as the holder and distributor of all the surplus wealth has
been obliterated by the new economic forces."
In the future, effective local management organizations will likely
derive their authority from state institutions Where policy-makers recognize the public policy benefits of greater decentralization of decisionmaking and administration.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE
The breakdown of local management systems results in part from the
integration of local communities into larger economic and political systems. The state becomes the principal unit for making and implementing
public policy. Inmany cases, states have assumed the right to administer
use of communal resources. Since independence, a majority of African
states "have declared all or most of their land to be state or national
land." 56 Former French colonies already had forest codes and pastoral
codes which provided for a direct state role in resource management
through administration of use permits and policing of the state's resource
domain, usually defined very broadly to include all but urban land.-"
Direct state management has rarely worked well. State agencies lack
timely information on resource condition and use practices.5 8 Local input
is often not solicited and local initiative is obstructed. Rule enforcement
can be capricious and arbitrary. 59 State authority is still weak, especially
in Africa. While states have usurped the last vestiges of local control
through legal reform, they have been unable to put in place an effective,
alternative system for managing collective resources.' But the kinds of
social and economic changes discussed above preclude a strategy based
wholly upon a return to local control. The result is a hiatus, in which
55. Schapera, Economic Changes in South African Native Life, I Africa 150 (1928).
56. J. Riddell & C. Dickerman, Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa 1986 (1986), at x.
57. For a review of forestry legislation in the Sahel, see K. Elbow & A. Rochegude, A Layperson's
Guide to the Forest Codes of Niger, Mali and Senegal (Land Tenure Center Research Paper No.
139, 1990).
58. Thomson, Land and Tree Tenure Issues in Three Francophone Sahelian Countries: Niger,
Mali and Burkina Faso, in Land, Trees and Tenure 211 (J. Raintree ed. 1987).
59. C. Lai & A. Khan, Mali as a Case Study of Forestry Policy in the Sahel: Institutional
Constraints on Social Forestry (ODI Social Forestry Network Paper 3e, 1986).
60. Thomson, supra note 58; S. Lawry, Tenure Policy and Natural Resource Management in
Sahelian West Africa (Land Tenure Center Paper No. 130, 1989).
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economic and political changes have combined to forestall effective local
action, and state regulation is ineffectual.
Under these circumstances (which are likely to pertain for some time
to come) it may be useful to think in terms of policies for shoring up the
respective weaknesses of states and communities in managing collective
resources. For instance, government action can help create the conditions
for local action by, for instance, clarifying group territorial rights, adjudicating boundary disputes, and providing technical assistance to local
groups attempting to intensify management.
In some situations gains might be achieved where communities and
the government enter into "co-management" arrangements. The government would assign group rights to a specific territory, provide technical
guidance on resource management practices, and help create a more
positive economic environment for cooperation by, for example, giving
a local cooperative preferential marketing rights to a local resource like
fuelwood, fish, or grazing. The local cooperative organization would
distribute income among members, mobilize community participation,
and advise the government on local acceptability of proposed management
practices and rules.
A co-management model could be especially helpful when dealing with
the problem of rule enforcement. The government can assist in enforcement of rules which have broad support in the community, especially
where community authority is not strong enough to curb "free-riding."
Co-management is exemplified by the approach taken by the USAID
project in the Guesselbodi Forest Reserve in Niger, and has evolved,
more or less out of trial and error, at Sehlabathebe in Lesotho. 6 In both
cases, co-management represents a major departure from ineffective state
policies to regulate resource use through administration of codes and
rules. These approaches rarely worked well, were costly, and contributed
to hostile community-state relations on resource issues.
Co-management would require relatively high levels of technical input
by trained staff. Such staff are in short supply, and this could be a
constraint to widespread implementation of co-management programs.
CONCLUSIONS
The apparent breakdown of local common property management arrangements is not simply attributable to capricious state actions. Break61. Case studies of these projects are provided in Heermans. The Guesselbodi Experiment: Bushland Management in Niger, 23-24 Rural Africana 67 (1986); S. Lawry, Communal Grazing and
Range Management: The Case of Grazing Association is Lesotho (African Livestock Policy Analysis
Network Paper No. 13, 1987).
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down has been the result of fundamental changes in rural economies.
Communal resources are increasingly marginal to the economic wellbeing of many individual villagers. The relative importance of communal
resources to household income varies considerably, undercutting the ability of democratically-constituted user groups to assert control over all
users. The political decline of traditional authority is in part due to their
reduced economic roles. The social and economic bases for collective
control of individual use are eroding. Policies must be based upon a
recognition of the limits and opportunities for local management. The
role of the state can be decisive in providing a legal framework and in
improving economic incentives for desirable management practices. To
date, state actions have usually been inappropriate and have rarely led to
improvement. Offered below are some summary policy conclusions.
1. Policy-makers wishing to promote local control of common property
resources should consider, in any given situation, whether appropriate
incentives exist for individuals to participate in collective resource management. Sustained local action is most likely to result where the resource
in question is scarce and of critical importance to the economic wellbeing of a large proportion of the community, and where the transactions
costs associated with collective action are less than would be the case if
resources were under individual control.
2. In some situations, government action can help create the conditions
for local action by clarifying group territorial rights, adjudicating boundary disputes, and providing technical assistance to local groups attempting
to intensify management. Local and state "co-management" may also
improve collective resource management. However, this will often require
higher levels of technical assistance than many countries can afford to
provide.
3. It will be difficult to interest local communities in programs to
improve management of resources which are not of high value, particularly if their conservation conflicts with the use of resources which are
of high value (for instance, wildlife and forest resources in areas of
expanding cultivation or grazing). Community attitudes might change if
a wider range of economic rights to the resources in question are extended
to villagers. For example, villagers might be given hunting rights where
none previously existed, or might be given a percentage of revenues
generated by state leases of hunting concession rights. Devolution of use
rights may not always be appropriate (for instance, rights to rare or
endangered plant and animal species) and direct state regulation may have
to remain the principal means of management.
Improvement in common property management is most likely to result
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from policies which recognize legitimate state and local interests in natural
resource management. Rapidly changing social and economic relationships require flexible and innovative management arrangements which
recognize the relative strengths and weaknesses of state and local institutions.

